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"The truth is that in the presidential office, as it has been con-
stituted since Jackson's time, American democracy has revived the
oldest political institution of the race, the elective kingship."
This assertion of Hehry Jones Ford in his Rise and Growt] of
American Politics, reminiscent of an earlier assertion of like import
made by Secretary of State Seward, suggests the theme of this new
volume by Edward S. Corwin, McCormick Professor of Jurispru-
dence at Princeton University
The work, which is an outgrowth of lectures given by Professor
Corwin at New York University in 1937 on the Stokes Foundation,
is both historical and analytical in nature. The emphasis is upon
the power of the President under the Constitution, and, while the
"personal aspects of the Presidency" are not neglected, they are
emphasized only when they seem "to have materially affected the
development of the office and its powers." After considering the
historical conceptions of the office and matters of qualification, elec-
tion and tenure, the author paints five portraits of the President.
as Admimstrative Chief, as Chief Executive, as Commander-in-
Chief, as the Organ of Foreign Relations and, lastly, as Popular
Leader and Legislator.
The book contains seven chapters, each of which is topically
arranged and summarized in several succinct paragraphs. A R6sum6
follows the last chapter. The work is exceedingly well documented
both in the text, which comprises 36 pages, and in the notes which
constitute about 132 pages. It is to be regretted that the notes are
concentrated at the back of the book. This reviewer greatly prefers
that they follow the text, but the extraordinary length of many of the
citations probably renders this impractical.
Asserting at the outset the vagueness of the constitutional grants
of power to the President, the author sketches the historical concep-
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tions ot the office. The early state constitutions, in which guber-
natorial office was "reduced almost to the dimensions of a symbol"
(P. 4), undoubtedly were influential sources of the Framers' con-
cepts of executive power, but "by no means the only source, or even
the chief source" (p. 6). The Framers were familiar with the con-
cepts of Locke, MIontesquieu and Blackstone, and what they had in
mind was the "balanced constitution" of these writers "which carried
with it the idea of a divided initiative in the matter of legislation and
a broad range of autonomous executive power or 'prerogative'"
(p. 15). In terms of actual experience, two conflicting conceptions
emerge (I) that the executive power "ought always to be subor-
4iii:tI" to the legislative power, and (2) that it ought to be more or
less "autonomous and self-directing" (p. 310). "Taken by and
large", the author concludes, "the history of the Presidency is a
history of aggrandizement, but the story is a highly discontinuous
one. Only about one in three of the individuals who have filled the
,,ffice "has contributed to the development of its powers" (p. 29)
Considering presidential tenure, the author avers that "the pre-
vailing sentiment of the Convention of 1787 favored the indefinite
religibility of the President, a sentiment which was owing in con-
siderable part to the universal expectation that Washington would be
the first person to be chosen President, and that he would live prac-
ticallv forever" (p. 35). In fact, the Framers "devised the Elec-
toral College with the intention of rendering the President in-
definitely re~ligible" (p. 62) In the light of these premises, the
ban on third terms is developed and appraised, and the conclusion is
reached that "it is impossible to adjudicate at all nicely between the
contending arguments" (p. 38). Nevertheless, a prophecy is added
to the effect that "if the anti-third-term taboo is once set aside, it
will take a long time for an anti-fourth-term or anti-fifth-term taboo
to develop. In a word, the presidential term will become indefinite"
(p. 38) The latter prediction may be questioned. In the review-
er's opinion, it will depend in part upon the strategy of the presiden-
tial candidate who seeks to challenge the incumbent. He will find
it difficult to succeed upon a multiplicity of issues that do not clash
or upon some tradition that is not made secure by constitutional
mandate.
Speaking of the Electoral College, the author emphasizes the
importance of a continuously dominant party or two fairly equal, al-
ternating parties. To avoid the danger of an election being thrown
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into the House of Representatives, he urges serious consideration of
the proposal advanced -by Senator Norris by which the Electoral Col-
lege as such would be abolished (p. 5). Likewise, the danger spot
of presidential disability, as in the cases of Garfield and Wilson, is
discussed and the enactment of some procedure to deal with it is
urged (p. 51).
The power of the President as "Administrative Chief" is con-
sidered in Chapter III. Three aspects are considered (i) the power
to appoint to office (p. 65), (2) supervisory power over subordinates
(p. 76), and (3) the removal power (p. 84).
With respect to the removal power, the author discusses in de-
tail the cases of Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, (p. 84) and
Hnwphrey v United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, (p. 91) In the former,
the Supreme Court upheld the power of the Executive to remove
from office a first-class postmaster notwithstanding an Act of Con-
gress requiring such removal to be "with the advice and consent of
the Senate." In the latter, the Court held that a member of the
Federal Trade Commission, appointed by President Hoover by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, was wrongfully removed
by President Roosevelt. In other words, "(i) as to agents of his
own powers, the President's removal power is illimitable; (2) as to
agents of Congress' constitutional powers, Congress may confine it
to removal for cause" (p. 96). Viewing the problem realistically,
Professor Corwin says that "The Myers Case was decided by a for-
mer President (Taft) under the influence of Jacksonian concepts."
The result "was soon perceived by the Court to clash with the doc-
trines which it bad been building up since about 189o with regard to
'a fair hearing' in connection especially with rate regulation, and in
the Humphrey Case it beat a precipitate retreat from the ideology of
the Myers decision" (pp. iO9, IIo).
Of added interest in this chapter is the author's discussion of
the problem of administrative reorganization. Two proposals of the
President's Committee on Administrative Management for the re-
organization of the executive branch of the National Government are
considered and evaluated, namely, its recommendations with respect
to the independent commissions and the Comptroller General (p.
96)
Treatment of the President as "Chief Executive" will especially
interest students of the law. The problem of congressional delega-
tion of power is given first attention. Beginning with the maxim
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derived from John Locke's Treatise on Civil Government that "the
legislature may not delegate its power" (p. 115), American practice
is traced from the earliest cases through the New Deal legislation.
The maxim, Professor Corwin concludes, "has passed its heyday,
along with the laissez-faire conception of the governmental function
of which it is a reflection" (p. 126).
Passing from executive practice and constitutional doctrine of
delegation of powers, the author deals at length with the emergency
powers of the President. From the doctrine of In re Neagle, 135
U. S. i, that "there is a peace of the United States" which entitles a
United States marshal to resist by force an assault on one of its
judges (p. 127), we are brought to the so-called "Stewardship
Theory" of Theodore Roosevelt, set forth in his Autobiography
(p. 131) The latter, which regards executive power to be "limited
only by specific restrictions... in the Constitution or imposed by the
Congress" (p. 131), is viewed by the author as "unquestionably dis-
ruptive of conventional views" (p. 132).
As supplementary to executive powers, the prerogative of par-
dons, amnesties and reprieves is considered. "Whereas Blackstone
was thinking of pardon as an instrument only of clemency. ., the
Framers regarded it as also an instrument of law enforcement" (p.
136). The case of Gerald Chapman, whose Federal sentence was
commuted by President Coolidge in order that he might be turned
over to Connecticut authorities for trial on a murder indictment, is
cited in support of this observation (p. 138).
To those who are inclined to speculate upon the war power of
the President, with or without a declaration by Congress, Chapters
V and VI will be of particular interest, even though they do not
answer all current questions.
Chapter V views the President as "Commander-in-Chief", pri-
marily "as the custodian and wielder within the United States itself
of the physical forces of the National Government" (p. I55) The
first phase of the discussion concerns Lincoln's war power. In addi-
tion to Lincoln's course of action and reasoning, the author refers
to the famous Prize Cases, 2 Bl. 635 (March IO, 1863) in which
the Supreme Court "endorsed for the time being the idea of presi-
dential dictatorship" (p. 158), and also to ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
2 (p. 162), the majority opinion of which registered reaction "from
these extremes of doctrine and practice" (p. 198). Nevertheless,
"candor compels recognition of the fact that in emergencies the legis-
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lative power has to stomach many a fairt accompli with such cheer-
fulness as it can muster" (p. 165)
This chapter also includes a discussion of the powers of the
President in situations of violence less than war (p. 166), his powers
in the establishment of martial law (p. 176), and his powers as the
result of Congressional delegation and as illustrated by VWorld War I
(p. I89).
In Chapter VI we obtain a view of the President as the "Organ
of Foreign Relations." Here, Professor Corwin's historical-analyti-
cal method finds its most effective expression. A sincere effort is
made to separate the powers of the President and Congress in the
field of foreign relations. The import of the entire chapter is clearly
expressed at the outset where the author says that "the Constitution,
considered only for its affirmative grants of powers which are capa-
ble of affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege
of directing American foreign policy In such a struggle the Presi-
dent has, it is true, certain great advantages, which are pointed out by
Jay in The Federalist, the unity of the office, its capacity for secrecy
and despatch, and its superior sources of information, to which
should be added the fact that it is always on hand and ready for
action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much of
the time. But despite all this, actual practice under the Constitution
has shown that while the President is usually in a position to pro-
pose, the Senate and Congress are often in a position to dispose.
The verdict of history, in short, is that the power to determine the
substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided power,
with the lion's share usually falling to the President, though by no
means always" (pp. 200, 201)
Even more emphatic, in this connection, is the author's conclu-
sion "No President has a mandate from the Constitution to conduct
our foreign relations according to his own sweet will. If his power in
that field is indefinite, so is Congress' legislative power, and if he
holds the 'sword', so does Congress hold the 'purse-strings.' For
the rest, the President's diplomatic powers are, and always have
been, a function of our foreign policy, and if they seem dangerously
great today it is partly 'because our position in the world has be-
come, for one reason or another, dangerously great" (p. 254)
The final portrait of the President-as "Popular Leader and
Legislator"-is a vivid, though incomplete, study in the personal
traits and concepts of individual Presidents as well as a study of
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presidential leaderslp. Beginning with the "literary sources of
presidential leadership" (p. 256), the author surveys "the consti-
tutional basis and modus operandi of presidential leadership from
Roosevelt I to Roosevelt II" (p. 264) "The present-day role of
the President as policy determiner in the legislative field is largely
the creation of the two Roosevelts and Woodrow Wilson, each of
whom came to the Presidency following a notable and successful
experience as governor of his home state" (p. 267) After analyzing
in some detail the technique of these individuals, the author con-
cludes that "presidential leadership has usually been a function of
two highly variable factors, Crisis and Personality" (p. 281).
Following a consideration of the veto power as a "positive"
weapon of presidential leadership (p. 282) and such "collateral fac-
tors" as patronage, filibusters and judicial review (p. 289), Pro-
fessor Corwin concludes with the problem of "stabilizing presiden-
tial leadership" (p. 297) He alleges that presidential leadership is
"discontinuous, not to say spasmodic, that it is too dependent on
the personality of the President rather than on the authority of the
office, that it is often insufficiently informed, especially as regards
the all important matter of administrative feasibility, and. finally
that the contact between the President and Congress is most faulty,
being, in fact, at the mercy of either's whim" (p. 300). As a rem-
edy, he suggests among other things that a reconstruction of the
Cabinet "is at least a promising expedient, and one to whi(h the
Constitution interposes no obstacles" (pp. 304, 307) This solution,
he admits, would not eliminate the "alleged undue influence of the
President on public opinion nowadays. For that, there is under our
system no remedy except an unshackled public opinion itself For
while Democracy implies leadership, it also implies criticism of that
leadership, criticism outspoken and unremitting" (pp. 307, 308)
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